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We develop  a multicountry,  dynamic  general  equilibrium  model  of 
product  innovation  and  international  trade to study the creation  of 
comparative  advantage  through  research  and development  and the 
evolution  of world trade over  time.  In our  model,  firms must incur 
resource  costs to introduce  new products,  and  forward-looking  po- 
tential  producers  conduct  R  &  D  and  enter  the  product  market 
whenever  profit  opportunities  exist.  Trade  has both  intraindustry 
and interindustry  components,  and the different  incentives that face 
agents  in  different  countries  for  investment  and  savings  decisions 
give rise to intertemporal  trade.  We derive  results on  the dynamics 
of trade patterns and trade volume  and on the temporal  emergence 
of  multinational  corporations. 
I.  Introduction 
International  economists  have  long  used  static  models  of  comparative 
advantage  and  (more  recently)  scale  economies  to  great  advantage  in 
studying  the  pattern  of  international  trade  and  the  normative  proper- 
ties  of  trading  equilibria.  But  increasingly,  issues  of  concern  to  the- 
orists  and  casual  observers  alike  are  inherently  dynamic  in  nature. 
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Attention  has focused  recently on the creation of comparative  advan- 
tage by technological  innovation,  the relationship  between  trade pol- 
icy and  economic  growth,  and  the  dynamic  evolution  of  the  volume 
and pattern  of  world  trade. The  static analysis of  international  trade 
must be extended  if we are to deal  with these  new concerns. 
In this paper, we develop  a multicountry,  dynamic, general  equilib- 
rium  model  of  product  innovation  and  international  trade  to study 
the creation of comparative  advantage  through  research and develop- 
ment (R & D) and the evolution  of world trade over time. We build on 
the  static analyses  of  trade  in  differentiated  products  by  Krugman 
(1979a,  1981),  Dixit  and  Norman  (1980),  and  Feenstra  and  Judd 
(1982),  and  also on Judd's  (1985)  investigation  of  product  develop- 
ment  in a closed  economy. 
In our model,  firms incur resource costs to introduce  new products. 
Forward-looking  potential  producers  conduct  R & D and  enter  the 
product  market  whenever  profit  opportunities  exist.  New  products 
substitute  imperfectly  for old,  and  prices, interest  rates, and the pat- 
tern of trade evolve  over time as more commodities  become  available 
for purchase.  Trade  has both intraindustry  and interindustry  compo- 
nents, with the former  governed  by R & D expenditures  and the latter 
by  resource  endowments.  International  capital  flows  take  place  to 
finance  R & D, and in some circumstances  multinational  corporations 
may emerge. 
The  approach  adopted  here  differs  in  important  respects  from 
several recent  studies  of  the dynamics  of  trade with product  innova- 
tion,  such  as  Krugman  (1979b),  Dollar  (1986),  Jensen  and  Thursby 
(1987),  and  Segerstrom,  Anant,  and  Dinopoulos  (1987).  These  pa- 
pers have provided  useful  insights  into the steady-state  properties  of 
trading equilibria when  products  are initially developed  in the North 
and later imitated  by the South.  But all except  perhaps  the last have 
been  incomplete  in important  ways, because  of  a failure  to incorpo- 
rate all general  equilibrium  interactions,  the lack of  consideration  of 
the  economic  factors  that  drive  the  rate  of  product  innovation,  or 
other  features.'  Our  framework  is distinguished  by its explicit  treat- 
More specifically,  Krugman  posits exogenous  rates of product  innovation  and imi- 
tation  to  study  the  determinants  of  steady-state  wages  and  welfare  in  a  one-sector 
model of the product cycle. Dollar improves on Krugman's work by allowing the rate of 
imitation to depend  on  manufacturing  cost differentials.  His relationship  is essentially 
ad hoc, and he maintains  Krugman's assumption  that the rate of product  innovation  is 
exogenous.  These  authors  do  not  consider  the  resource  costs of  innovation  and  imi- 
tation,  nor  do  they  allow  for  intertemporal  profitability  considerations.  Jensen  and 
Thursby  do allow  R & D to be determined  by intertemporal  profit maximization,  but 
they assume  that there  is a single,  monopolistic  developer  and  that the interest  rate is 
exogenous  and constant.  None  of these  studies,  or any other  with which we are f'amil- 
iar, devotes  much attention  to the evolution  of the pattern of trade along  the path to a 
steady state, which is our  primary concern  here. PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  1263 
ment  of  both  the  private  incentive  for  investment  in R & D and  the 
resource  requirements  of  this activity. 
In order  to focus sharply on the dynamics of product development 
and the creation of comparative  advantage  by R & D, in this study we 
abstract from all forms of factor accumulation.  'This abstraction helps 
us to bring out the novel  features  introduced  by endogenous  innova- 
tion and  renders  the exercise  more  tractable. Future  research  might 
gainfully  consider  the  interaction  between  the  evolution  of  the  pat- 
tern of  trade that is dictated  by technological  progress  and the more 
familiar dynamics  emanating  from  resource  expansion. 
The  organization  of the paper and some of the major results are as 
follows.  In  Section  II,  we  develop  the  model  and  derive  the  world 
equilibrium  that would  result in the absence of any international  bor- 
ders. Section III presents our investigation  of the pattern of trade in a 
two-country,  two-factor  world,  with the factors interpreted  to be un- 
skilled labor and human  capital. If both R & D and the production  of 
differentiated  goods  are more human capital-intensive  activities than 
the production  of a traditional good  and if all activities bear Leontief 
production  technologies,  then the human  capital-rich  country will be 
a  net  exporter  of  differentiated  products  and  an  importer  of  the 
traditional  good  at every moment in  time. This  is true  despite  the  fact 
that the  human  capital-rich  country  initially devotes  more  of  its re- 
sources to R & D (as opposed  to production)  and despite  the fact that 
trade is not balanced along  the equilibrium  path. The  model  predicts 
a rising share of trade in world gross national product  (GNP), at least 
when R & D is the most human capital intensive of the three activities. 
Concerning  intertemporal  trade,  we  show  that  the  human  capital- 
rich  country  has  both  a  greater  incentive  to  invest  and  a  greater 
incentive  to save (per capita),  the latter because  of  its declining  rela- 
tive factor income.  Consequently,  it appears that this country may run 
either a surplus or a deficit on current account in the dynamic equilib- 
rium. 
In Section  IV, we introduce  the  possibility of  multinational  corpo- 
rations in the manner  of  Helpman  (1984).  We assume that headquar- 
ter services can be separated  geographically  from  production  activi- 
ties and that only the former  must take place in the country in which a 
differentiated  product  has been  developed.  If  headquarter  services 
are more  human  capital intensive  than production,  then  the possibil- 
ity of  multinational  activity  expands  the  set  of  distributions  of  the 
world's  factor  endowment  for  which  international  exchange  can re- 
produce  the  integrated  world  equilibrium.  For certain  compositions 
of  factor endowments,  we predict  that multinational  enterprises  will 
emerge  at a particular point in time and remain active ever after. The 
extent  of  multinationality,  as  measured  by output,  employment  of 1264  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
subsidiaries,  or  the  number  of  multinational  firms,  expands  over 
time, at least initially and as the world economy  approaches  the steady 
state. 
II.  A Dynamic  Model  of  R & D 
We consider  a world economy  with three activities: the production  of 
a "traditional" commodity  under  competitive  conditions,  the produc- 
tion of a continuum  of varieties of a "modern" industrial product, and 
research  and  development  that leads  to the acquisition  of  the  know- 
how needed  to produce  new brands of the industrial good.  Our mod- 
ern  goods  are  horizontally  differentiated,  so  that  newly  invented 
products do not displace older  varieties. We leave for future  research 
the  issue  of  trade  dynamics  in  a  world  of  vertically  differentiated 
products,  in which  products  become  obsolete  after  a time. 
At every point in time there exists a given (measure of the) number 
of varieties that were developed  in the past. Producers of these variet- 
ies  engage  in  oligopolistic  competition  by  setting  prices.  Given  de- 
mands and costs, this process determines  prices, outputs,  and current 
operating  profits.  An  entrepreneur  who  contemplates  developing  a 
new  brand  can  calculate  the  future  stream  of  potential  operating 
profits.  He  or  she  chooses  to develop  the  brand  only  if the  present 
value  of  this  stream  is at  least  as  large  as  the  cost  of  R & D.  The 
competitive  entry process leads to aggregate  investment  in R & D such 
that a brand's development  cost is just equal to the present value of its 
future  profits (unless  no further  products  are developed). 
As in Helpman  and  Krugman  (1985),  it proves convenient  to solve 
for  the  "integrated  world  equilibrium,"  that  is, the  equilibrium  that 
would obtain in the absence  of any international  borders.  Under con- 
ditions  that  give  rise  to  factor  price  equalization,  a  world  trading 
equilibrium  reproduces  the integrated  equilibrium  in its essential de- 
tails.  So  properties  of  the  latter  equilibrium  can  be  applied  to  the 
analysis of the former.  For this reason  the following  discussion  deals 
first with the  integrated  economy. 
A.  Consumers 
Infinitely  lived consumers  maximize  total lifetime  utility. The  repre- 
sentative  consumer  has  a time-separable  intertemporal  utility func- 
2  The  model studied  by Segerstrom  et al. (1987)  does have the feature that improved 
products  cause older  variants to disappear,  but the analysis focuses only on the steady- 
state properties  of  the equilibriuni. PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  1265 
tion 
U  =  leogtog  (-) dt,  (1) 
where p is the constant  subjective discount  rate and u(-) is an instanta- 
neous  subutility  function.  We adopt  a particular  form  for u(0), 
U= LTc  (i)a  di  C'  ot, sX E  (0,  1),  (2) 
where  cy(i)  is consumption  of differentiated  product  i, c, is consump- 
tion of the traditional  good,  and n is the (measure  of the) number  of 
available varieties.  We note  that this form  implies  constant  expendi- 
ture shares sx and  1 -  sx on commodity  classes x and y, and a constant 
elasticity of  substitution  between  any two differentiated  products  of 
a=  1/(1  -  at) >  1. 
The  consumer's  maximization  problem  can be solved  in two stages. 
First we find {fc(i)}  and c, to maximize  u(-) given  total expenditure  at 
time  t, E(t),  prices,  and  the  available  brands.  Then  we solve  for  the 
time  pattern  of  expenditures  that maximizes  U. The  solution  to the 
first stage gives  instantaneous  demand  functionsX 
cX(i) =  sxE 
W 
(3) 
p(j)'--5dj 
()) 
and c,  =  (1 -  sx)E/lp,  where p(i) is the price of differentiated  product 
i and py is the  price of  the  traditional  good. 
In maximizing  U, the consumer  must satisfy an intertemnporal  bud- 
get  constraint.  We  assume  that  the  consumer  can  borrow  or  lend 
freely  on  a capital  market  with  instantaneous  rate  of  interest  R (T). 
The  budget  constraint  is 
e-I R  (T)-R  (t)  IE(T)  dT  e-[I  R(T)  R (t)]  I(T)  dT +  A  (t),  (4) 
where  I(T)  is  the  consumer's  factor  income  in  period  T,  A(t)  is the 
value  of  his accumulated  assets  at t, with A(0)  =  0,  and  R(T)  is the 
cumulative  interest  factor  through  time  T.  Then  if we substitute  (3) 
into (2) and the result into (1), the first-order condition  for maximiz- 
ing  U subject to (4) at t  =  0 implies' 
yE=  R  _  P.  (5) 
3  See  Helpman  and  Krugman  (1985,  chap.  6) for more  details. 
A  This  can be seen  as follows.  The  indirect  utility function  derived  from  (2) has the 
form v[p(t), E(t)] = E(t)f(p(t)).  Then  log u(-) =  log E(t) +  logf(p(t)),  and the first-order 
condition for maximization  of  (1) implies e  Pt/E(t)  =  (e R(),  where 4  is the time- 
independent  Lagrange  multiplier  associated  with the  budget  constraint  in (4). 1266  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
B.  Producers 
Costs of manufacturing  industrial  products  comprise  two parts, fixed 
development  costs  and  variable  production  costs.  Production  takes 
place under constant  returns to scale, and the input requirements  for 
R & D do not vary with the number  of innovating  firms. Let 4.(wf)  be 
the unit cost in production  and 4>,(wf)  the cost of developing  a brand, 
where  wf is a vector of  input  prices.5 These  costs are the same for all 
brands,  regardless  of whether  or not the variety has previously  been 
introduced  by another  entrepreneur.  Then  4(-)  is the fixed cost and 
X()  is  the  average  and  marginal  variable  cost  for  all  firms  in  this 
sector. 
The  number  of  potential  products  is  infinite.  Therefore,  it  will 
never  be rational  for an entrepreneur  to develop  an already existing 
brand, and each innovator  enjoys monopoly  power in the production 
of  his particular variety for  the indefinite  future. 
A producer  of  an  existing  brand  faces  at time  t a measure  n(t)  of 
competitors  who  have  developed  products  in  the  past.  He  takes  as 
given  the aggregate  expenditure  level E(t)  and  the  pricing  policy of 
the  competitors  and  sets  the  price  of  his  brand  so  as  to  maximize 
operating  profits, namely,  revenue  minus  production  costs, using the 
demand  function  given  in (3). As is well known,  this results in fixed- 
markup  pricing  over  unit  production  costs.  Since  all producers  are 
similar, we consider  the  symmetric  equilibrium.  In this equilibrium, 
output  per  variety x(i)  =  x and  prices p(i)  =  p for  all i  E  [0,  n(t)] 
satisfy 
x  =  Ex-  (6) 
pn 
and 
cap=  ((wf).  (7) 
The  resulting  operating  profits  per variety are 
9~~~~~ 
IT  =  (1  -Ot)Sx-  (8) 
n 
An entrepreneur  has perfect  foresight  regarding  the evolution  of 
spending  E and  the  number  of  firms n.  Therefore,  using  (8), he has 
perfect  foresight  regarding  profits per variety. In an equilibrium  the 
present  value  of  these  profits  cannot  exceed  current  R & D  costs. 
Hence,  if at time  t there  is positive  but finite  investment  in product 
' An  implicit  assumption  here  is that  product  development  does  not  require  finite 
time. We could relax this assumption  without substantially affecting  the structure of the 
model. PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  1267 
development,  each  new variety breaks even,  that is, 
e  [R (T)  R(t)]r(T)  dT  =  [Wf(t)  (9) 
We normalize  nominal  prices so that 
1 =  4,[wf(t)]  for  all  t.  (10) 
With this choice  of  numeraire,  (9) implies  that the  instantaneous  in- 
terest rate is equal  to the flow of  operating  profits,  that is, 
'U(t) = R~(t).  (I11) 
The  traditional good  also is produced  subject to constant returns to 
scale. Its unit cost function  is Xy(wf).  Its price, which equals marginal 
cost, satisfies 
Py =  !y  (wf)  (12) 
Equations  (7),  (10),  and  (12)  describe  the  equilibrium  relationships 
between  product  and  factor  prices. 
C.  Integrated  Equilibrium 
First, substitute  (8) and  (11) into  (5) to obtain 
E  ~~E 
=  (1  -x)sx  -  -  P.  (13) 
This  is the first differential  equation  that will be used  to describe  the 
evolution  of  the  integrated  economy  over  time.  It shows  the  rate of 
change  of  spending  as  a  function  of  spending  and  the  number  of 
available varieties.  The  next  step  is to derive  a differential  equation 
for changes  in the number  of available brands,  that is, an investment 
equation. 
Let a,(wf)  be the (column  vector) gradient  of the unit cost function 
X(~wf),  z  =  n, x, y. Then  a,(wf)  represents  the employment  vector per 
unit output  at factor prices Wf,  and the factor market-clearing  condi- 
tions are 
a,(wf)it  +  ax(wf)X  +  ay(wf)Y  =  V,  (14) 
where 
X  =  nx  (15) 
is  the  aggregate  output  of  industrial  products,  Y is output  of  the 
traditional  goods,  and  V  is the  vector  of  available inputs.  Using  (7), 
(10),  (12),  and  (14),  together  with the  goods  market-clearing  condi- 1 268  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
tions 
E 
S'\  -  = x  (16) 
and 
(1  -  s,)  =  Y,  (17) 
we can solve for equilibrium  commodity  and factor prices and sectoral 
output  levels all as a function  of  the level of spending,  E. We denote 
these  functional  relationships  by w1  (E), p(E), pY(E),  X(E),  Y(E), and 
t  =  v(E).  (18) 
Equations (13) and (18) constitute  an autonomous  system of differ- 
ential  equations.  They  apply  whenever  the  implied  rate of  product 
development  is nonnegative.  Global stability requires the function  v(0) 
to be declining  in E  whenever  v(E)  >  0.  For now,  we simply assume 
that this condition  is satisfied5s 
The  phase  diagram  for  the  system  is depicted  in  figure  1. From 
E 
E=O 
E 
X,  n 
n 
FIG. I 
"i  For the  special  case that we consider  in the  next  subsection,  we establish  that the 
stability condition  is always satisfied. PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  12 60 
(13), we see that the E  =  0 schedule  is an upward-sloping  line in (E, n) 
space with slope given by p/(1  - co)s,. Equation (18) implies that i  =  0 
for some  particular value of E, which we denote  by E. The  horizontal 
line in the figure depicts  points at which there  is no product  develop- 
ment.  Note  that there  can be  no  equilibrium  of  the  economy  above 
this line  because  this  would  require  negative  product  development, 
which of' course  is not feasible.7 The  relevant regions  in the figure are 
those  on  or below  the  horizontal  line. 
Point S in the figure  represents  the steady state. For n(O) < i,  there 
is a single  trajectory that leads to point  S, represented  by the dashed 
path. This is, in fact, the unique  equilibrium trajectory for n(O) <  h. For 
initial  points  below  this  trajectory,  expenditure  approaches  zero  as 
time progresses,  which violates the conditions  for consumer  optimiza- 
tion.  For initial points  above  the  path, the conditions  for profit max- 
imization  ultimately  are violated.  To  see  this, note  that any such tra- 
jectory  hits the horizontal  line along  which h  =  0 at a point such as S' 
to  the  left  of  S.  With  E  =  E,  it  remains  there  ever  after.  But  the 
constancy  of  expenditure  implies,  from  (5), that R  =  p. Since  S'  is 
above the upward-sloping  ray, operating  profits  UT  =  (1 - cx)sE/n  are 
larger than p and hence  the interest rate. This means that the present 
value  of' operating  profits  exceeds  the  cost  of  R  &  D,  making  it 
profitable  to develop  new products  at S'. Therefore,  trajectories that 
hit the horizontal  line to the left of S are not consistent  with long-run 
equilibrium.8 
D.  Special Case 
We now consider  a special case that will be used to discuss trade issues. 
There  are  only  two  factors  of  production-unskilled  and  skilled 
labor-and  there  are fixed  input-output  coefficients.')  Hence, 
V  =  [  ,  w1  = [],  az(w1)  =  [  for z = n, x, Y, 
7Suppose  that ii  =  0, and consider  the system of equilibrium  conditions  comprising 
(7), (10), (12), (14), (16), and (17). These  are 5  +  k equations  in 5  +  k unknowns,  where 
k is the number  of factors of production.  The  unknowns  in this system are the k factor 
rewards, two prices for final consumer  goods,  two aggregate  output  levels for the final- 
goods  sectors,  and  the  expenditure  level.  Naturally,  the  solution  for the expenditure 
level in this system is E. Thus  ii =  0 in equilibrium  implies E  E, and the system can be 
only on or below  the  horizontal  line in the  figure. 
8  If the  initial number  of' products  exceeds  ii, the economy  settles immediately  at a 
stationary state, with the number  of varieties and all real magnitudes  forever  constant. 
In what follows, attention  is focused  on the case in which the initial number of' products 
is smaller than  hi. 
') While our approach  remains  valid for more general  production  functions  than the 1270  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
where  L stands  for  unskilled  labor and  H stands  for  human  capital, 
which is our measure  of skilled labor. We assume  that the traditional 
sector is the least human  capital intensive  and that the overall human 
capital  to labor ratio satisfies aHylaLy  <  HIL <  all!lajj  forj  =  x, n. The 
latter assumption  is needed  to ensure  full employment. 
The  comparative  statics analysis of (7), (10), (12), (14), (16), and (17) 
that  is  executed  in  the  Appendix  shows  that  the  function  v(E)  is 
declining  for this case. Therefore,  the dynamic  path is as described  in 
figure  1; the number  of available brands and expenditure  are increas- 
ing over  time.  This  in turn  implies  that the level of  R & D activity is 
declining  through  time,  as well  as the  following  price  and  quantity 
dynamics  (see the Appendix  for  a proof).'0 
PROPOSITION  1. (a) zclw  >  py/py >  p/p >  r/r;  (b)  pY  >  0; (c) r <  0; (d) p 
>  0  if  and  only  if  aHllaI.,  >  alx/a1  x;  (e)  ailat  <  0;  (f)  X  >  0;  (g)  Y < 0  if 
and  only  if  arll,,a1.,  >  all/a1jx;  and  (h)  E  >  0. 
We see that the real wage  (of unskilled  labor) is rising and the real 
reward  to human  capital  is falling  through  time.  This  statement  re- 
fers,  however,  only  to  the  standard  method  of  measuring  real  in- 
comes.  Since  in this type  of  an environment  variety is valued  per se 
(see Helpman  and  Krugman  1985, chap.  6) and the available variety 
increases  over  time,  real  incomes  of  unskilled  workers  necessarily 
increase  but real incomes  of  skilled workers  need  not decline."  The 
Leontief  technology,  the dynamics  that result are considerably  more complicated  than 
here. We have so far been  unable to derive interesting  results about trade dynamics for 
the  general  case. 
'1  In deriving  our comparative  statics results, we have assumed  that full employment 
of  both  factors obtains  all along  the  equilibrium  trajectory. As is well known,  even  in 
static models,  full employment  is not guaranteed  for fixed-coefficient  production  func- 
tions.  In the steady state of our dynamic  system we have an essentially  static two-sector 
model  (because  R & D is zero)  with a piecewise-linear,  kinked  transformation  curve. 
Full employment  then  requires  restrictions on the parameters  of the utility function  so 
that the slope of the indifference  curve at the kink, adjusted  for the degree  of monop- 
oly power  1  /le, falls between  the slopes of the flat portions  of the transformation  curve. 
Put differently,  full employment  obtains in the steady state if, for E  =  E, the solution to 
the system of equations  (7), (10), (12), (14), (16), (17), and (18) yields nonnegative  factor 
rewards. We also require  nonnegative  values of the factor rewards when  the system is 
solved  with E  =  E(O). These  two conditions  at the endpoints  ensure  full employment 
and nonnegative  factor rewards along  the entire  equilibrium  trajectory since the wage 
rate is rising and the reward to human  capital is falling whenever  there  is full employ- 
ment  (see parts a, b, and c of' proposition  1). If these  conditions  are not met, however, 
there  may be unemployment  of unskilled  labor during  an initial phase of the dynamic 
equilibrium,  unemployment  of  human  capital during  an ultimate  stage, or both. 
l The  temporal  indirect  utility function  of a representative  agent is calculated to be 
constant  +  s,(t-  I  -  1) log n  +  log I-  [s, logp  +  (1  -  s)  logpy], 
where I is his income.  The  last two terms represent  the usual real income  component, 
where the last term represents  the deflator.  It is clear from  part a of proposition  1 that 
this real income  component  is rising for unskilled  workers and falling for skilled work- 
ers.  However,  apart  from  this component,  there  exists  the  term  with n, which repre- PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  127  1 
product  development  sector contracts while the production  of indus- 
trial goods  expands.  The  decline  in R & D can be understood  intui- 
tively  as  follows.  At  least  in  the  neighborhood  of  the  steady  state, 
demand  for  each  individual  variety  and  hence  profitability  in  the 
industrial  sector  decline  over  time  (see  Sec.  IV).  As  the  profit  rate 
falls, the (real) interest rate must fall as well if entrepreneurs  are to be 
willing to invest in innovation.  But as long  as the interest rate remains 
above  the  discount  rate,  spending  is rising,  and  resources  must  be 
released  from  the  R  & D  sector  to  satisfy  the  increased  consumer 
demand.  The  process stops when the profit rate has fallen to the level 
of the discount  rate, at which time spending  ceases to grow, but then 
consumers  spend  all  their  income  and  no  savings  exist  to  finance 
further  innovation. 
III.  The  Pattern  of  Trade  in a Two-Country 
World 
We suppose  now  that the  world  consists  of  two countries,  labeled  A 
and B. The  two countries  share common  tastes and technologies  iden- 
tical to those  specified  for  the  integrated  economy.  We allow for the 
existence  of  integrated  world  commodity  and  financial  markets  but 
assume  that factor services and  "blueprints" are not tradable.  In this 
section  we assume  as well that an entrepreneur  cannot  establish pro- 
duction  facilities  offshore;  we  relax  this assumption  in the  next  sec- 
tion to allow for the emergence  of multinational  corporations.  We ask 
first whether,  with trade,  the world equilibrium  replicates  that of the 
integrated  economy,  as described  in Section  IID. In other  words, we 
consider  the conditions  under  which factor price equalization  charac- 
terizes the trade equilibrium.  Then,  for those  cross-country  divisions 
of H  and L that indeed  are consistent  with factor  price equalization 
everywhere  along  the equilibrium  path, we describe  the evolution  of 
world trade. 
Consider  figure  2.  The  dimensions  of  the  rectangle  in  the  figure 
represent  worldwide  factor  endowments,  with  the  division  of  these 
endowments  between  countries  represented  by a point  such  as E  in 
the interior of the rectangle.  For concreteness,  we suppose  that coun- 
try A  is the  relatively  human  capital-rich  country,  that  is, HalLa > 
HblLb- 
At time t =  0, the resource  allocation of the integrated  equilibrium 
is  found  by  substituting  E(O)  and  n(O)  =  0  from  the  equilibrium 
trajectory into (7), (10),  (12), (14), (16), (17), and (18) and solving for 
sents  the  love-of-variety  effect.  This  real  income  component  is rising  as a result  of 
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ut(O),  X(O), and Y(O).  12 Let points Q0 and Co in the figure represent  this 
allocation, where vector AQ0 is employed  in R & D, Q0CO  is employed 
in the  modern  sector,  and  C0B is employed  in the  traditional  sector 
(and the slopes  of these  vectors correspond  to the factor proportions 
required  in each of  these  activities). The  allocation  of the  integrated 
equilibrium  can  be  achieved  in a two-country  world  as long  as it  is 
possible  to  decompose  the  industry  employment  vectors  into  non- 
negative  components  for  each  country  that  exhaust  their  separate 
endowments.  In  the  figure,  this  is  accomplished  with  employment 
vectors AMO  (=  APO +  P0M0) and M0E in country A and vectors EZ( 
(=  M0NO  +  N0C0)  and  Z0B in country  B. Evidently,  the  feasibility 
of  such  a decomposition  requires  that  point  E  be  in  the  interior  of 
the triangle AC0B.  A sufficient  condition  for this is anllaL,  >  HalLa  > 
Hb/Lb>  aly/aiy. 
In the steady state,  R & D ceases,  and  all resources  are devoted  to 
production.  Let point  Cx represent  the allocation  of resources  to the 
12  The  system of  equations  that determines  resource  allocations,  commodity  prices, 
and  factor  rewards  yields  a solution  for X(O) that  is strictly positive  when  E  =  E(O), 
despite  the fact that n(O) =  0. Strictly positive consumption  of both classes of goods  is 
dictated  by the  Cobb-Douglas  form  of  the  subutility  function.  It requires,  of  course, 
that x(t) x-*  as t -*  0 from above.  Although  our model  breaks down at t =  0, it is well 
behaved  in the limit as t -*  0 from  above.  Therefore,  we feel justified  in ignoring  the 
technical  problems  that arise at time  0. PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  12 7q 
two  productive  sectors  in  the  steady-state  equilibrium  of  the  inte- 
grated economy.  In the diagram, we depict the case in which R & D is 
more  human  capital intensive  than  production  of  the differentiated 
products.  In any event,  the allocation at point C'  can be decomposed 
into feasible  allocations  for the two countries  provided  that a1/xla1.  > 
HalLa  >  Hb/Lb  >  aHylaLy.  In the figure, this decomposition  is achieved 
by allocating in country A the vector of factors AM'  to the production 
of modern  goods  and the vector M'E  to the production  of y. l3 Finally, 
consider  allocations  at times between  t =  0 and t =  oc. Points C' and 
C2 represent  sectoral allocations for the equilibrium of the integrated 
economy.  Each  such  point  can  be  viewed  as an  allocation  of  some 
factors  to  industry  y and  some  factors  to  the  combined  activity of 
development  and production  of modern  goods.  The  latter composite 
activity requires  factors  in  proportions  intermediate  to the  require- 
ments  for the two component  activities. It follows  that if it is feasible 
to  decompose  the  employment  vectors  of  the  integrated  economy 
corresponding  to the initial allocation  and the steady-state allocation, 
then  it will also be  possible  to do  so  for  all times  between  these  ex- 
tremes.  A sufficient  condition  for  factor  price equalization  to obtain 
all along the path of the trade equilibrium  is that the human capital to 
labor ratios of the two countries  be bounded  by the factor intensities 
of  (i)  the  less  human  capital-intensive  activity among  R & D  and 
production  of differentiated  products  and (ii) the production  of good 
y. For the remainder  of  this section,  we shall assume  that this condi- 
tion is satisfied. 
At an arbitrary point in time, the full employment  conditions  for a 
single  country  can be represented  with the help  of  (14)-(17)  as 
LI=  aL-  Y, +  ax  sxE  n  +  anhi  (19) 
np 
and 
Hi  =  aHy  F  +  au x  ns  - +  alln'r,,  (20) 
for  i  =  a, b. Combining  these  two equations  and  eliminating  Yi, we 
have 
i,  +  b(t) n  = 
13  We must show further  that this proposed  allocation of resources to the production 
of industrial goods  in each country is consistent  with the number of products previously 
developed  there  since outputs  of  all varieties  are equal  in the  integrated  equilibrium. 
We  establish  below  that  this  condition  is  indeed  satisfied  for  the  proposed  decom- 
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where 
Li[(Hi~i)  -(aHylaj-y)] 
ak-  ffla,)  a  /1)'for  i  =  a,  b,  I 
aiLs  [(aH,  / aI,,,,)  -(aHylaljy)] 
b  (t)  a1  x[(a11xa1,x)  -  (aHyla1y)]  sxE(t) 
a,  n[(aHnla,,,)  -  (aHylaLy)]  n (t)p (t) 
and  the  functions  E(t), p(t),  and  n(t) are  taken  from  the  integrated 
world equilibrium.  This differential  equation  can be solved explicitly, 
which gives 
n1(t)  =  ki  {  e-fb(T)dT  dz.  (21) 
In writing  (21),  we have  set ni(O) =  0. 
An important  conclusion  emerges  from  equation  (21): the ratio of 
the  numbers  of  differentiated  goods  produced  in  either  country  is 
constant for all t. We see that  na(t)lnb(t)  =  kalkb.  Then the ratio of R & 
D activity in the two countries,  na'nb,  is also constant and equal to kalkb, 
as is the ratio of  the  total outputs  of  modern  goods,  XalXb  14 
These  features  of  the  trade equilibrium  can also be seen  from  fig- 
ure 2. Recall that the points M0, M', M2, and M'  represent  allocations 
of  factors  in  country  A  to  the  composite  activity of  R & D and  the 
production  of  differentiated  goods  in  the  two-country  equilibrium. 
These  points all lie on a straight line through  E with slope aH/laVy.  We 
can  further  decompose  these  allocations  into  vectors  of  factors  em- 
ployed  in  the  component  industries.  For example,  at time  1 (corre- 
sponding  to  global  allocation  Cl),  country  A  employs  the  vector  of 
factors  AP'  in  R  & D  and  the  vector  P'M'  in  the  production  of 
differentiated  products,  while country  B employs M'N1  in R & D and 
N'C'  in producing  modern  goods.  The  corresponding  points for time 
2 are shown in figure  3, where  we have enlarged  the relevant portion 
of figure  2. In figure  3, the triangles A P 1M  l and M 1  N ' C'  are similar 
triangles,  as  are  the  triangles  AP2M2  and  M2N2C2.  Thus,  at  each 
moment  in time, the ratio of investments  in R & D in the two countries 
equals  the  ratio of  their  total outputs  of  differentiated  products.  Fi- 
nally,  because  MIM2  is  parallel  to  CIC2, both  of  these  ratios  must 
remain  constant  through  time. 
We are now prepared  to investigate  the evolution  of the pattern of 
trade.  Consider  first  the  direction  of  trade  in  traditional  goods  at 
some  arbitrary time t. From equations  (19) and  (20) we can solve for 
"' We note  that x(t) is common  to goods  produced  in both countries  because  factor 
price equalization  implies  equal  prices of  the different  differentiated  goods,  and thus 
equal amounts  of these  goods  are demanded  by consumers.  Since Xi(t) =  ni(t)x(t), the 
last statement  follows. PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  1275 
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the ratio of  outputs,  which  is given  by 
Ya(t) _  L,[h,(t)  -  (Ha/La)] 
Yb(t)  Lb[h,(t)  -  (Hb/Lb)] 
where hM(t)  is the human  capital to labor ratio in the composite  activity 
of R & D and production  of the modern  goods.  Since h, is a weighted 
average of the human  capital intensities  of the two component  activi- 
ties, it is bounded  by h,,  aHl/aI  ,  and hx  ablxlatex.  But each of these 
exceeds  hi =  HIL,  under  the conditions  needed  for factor price equal- 
ization,  so  h1(t)  -  (Hb/Lb  )  >  h,(t)  -  (H0/L(J) >  0.  It  follows  that 
Ya(t) Yb(t)  K<  LILb 
Next we calculate the ratio of demands  for the traditional good.  In 
each  country,  expenditure  on  good  y is a constant  fraction  of  total 
expenditure.  Since  consumers  in both  countries  face  the  same  price 
for the good,  the  ratio of  aggregate  demands  is equal to the ratio of 
total expenditures.  Now, from (5), E1(t) =  EJ(O)eR(t)  Pt, soE,(t)lEb(t) 
Ea(O)lEb(O).  This  ratio is, in turn,  equal  to the  ratio of  initial wealth 
levels, that is, 
E  e  - R (t)[w(t) +  r(t)h,] dt 
Eb (O)  =  La  f  (22) 
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Note  that the  ratio of  initial wealth  levels  on  the  right-hand  side  of 
(22)  includes  only  factor  incomes  because  initial  asset  holdings  are 
zero and  assets acquired  along  the  path earn  no excess  returns. 
Equation  (22)  and  halhb  >  1 together  imply  Ea(O)lEb(O)  >  LalLb 
Thus  the ratio of demands  for good y, Cya(t)/Cyb(t),  also exceeds  LalLb 
Since  Ya(t)/Yb(t)  <  LalLb,  it  follows  immediately  that  Cya(t)/Cyb(t)  > 
Ya (t)  Yb  (t).  But  cya(t)  +  Cyb  (t)  =  Ya  (t)  +  Yb(t) by market clearing, imply- 
ing cya(t) >  Ya(t), as stated  in the  following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  2. The  human  capital-rich  country imports the labor- 
intensive,  traditional  good  at every  moment  in time. 
It is not surprising,  of course,  that factor endowments  should  play a 
major role in determining  the direction  of trade in traditional goods. 
What is surprising,  perhaps,  is that neither  the diversion  of resources 
to R & D nor  the  existence  of  aggregate  trade  imbalances  can upset 
the  strong  prediction  of  the  Heckscher-Ohlin  theorem  at any point 
along  the equilibrium  path. 
We establish  a similar  result  for  trade  in differentiated  products. 
Each differentiated  product  is manufactured  in only one country,  yet 
each is consumed  worldwide,  so the direction  of trade in the individ- 
ual  products  is clear-cut.  The  existence  of  such  intraindustry  trade 
features  prominently  in  the  static  models  of  trade  with  increasing 
returns  to scale. We focus  here  on the aggregate  pattern of trade for 
the  sector  as a whole.  We have  already  shown  that Xa/Xb  is constant 
over time.  So too is CxalCxb,  where  CX-  =  ncx. This  ratio, like that for 
consumption  of  good  y, equals  the ratio of  initial wealth levels in the 
two countries.  Now if Cxa/Cxb  >  XalXb,  this would imply that country A 
imports  both  goods for all t. But  such  an outcome  would  violate  the 
(aggregate)  intertemporal  budget  constraint  (4). We conclude,  there- 
fore,  that CxalCxb  <  XalXb,  as recorded  in the  following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  3. The  human  capital-rich  country  is a net exporter 
of differentiated  products  at every  moment  in time. 
Next  we consider  the volume  of trade, which is defined  as the sum 
of exports  across countries  and industries.  In our case, it is given  by 
VT  =  Py(Yb  -  SbY)  +  SaPXb  +  SbpXa, 
where s, (i =  a, b) is the share of country i in spending,  and Xi =  nix is 
country  i's output  of  manufactures.  Dividing  by world spending  and 
rearranging,  we obtain 
VTYbX 
E_  =  (  -  sx)  Sb  +  Sx Sa  X  +  Sb  X  (23) 
where X and Y are the aggregate  output  levels for the world economy. 
The  second  term  on  the  right-hand  side  is constant  on  the dynamic 
trajectory. The  first term  changes  as a result of  shifts in country  B's PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  1277 
share of  output  of  traditional  goods.  When  R & D is human  capital 
intensive  relative  to production  of differentiated  products,  Yb'Y  rises 
through  time  and  the volume  of  trade rises faster than spending.  In 
addition,  because of declining  investment,  the ratio of world spending 
to  world  GNP  increases  over  time.  Hence,  we  have  established  the 
following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  4. If product  development  is human  capital intensive 
relative to production  of differentiated  products,  the volume  of world 
trade grows  faster  than  world  spending  and GNP. 
Finally, we consider  the pattern  of  intertemporal  trade. Aggregate 
national savings (the difference  between  GNP and total expenditure) 
are used to accumulate  foreign  assets. We may think of these assets as 
ownership  shares  in firms, in which case current  account  imbalances 
give  rise to foreign  equity  ownership.  Or we may think  instead  that 
international  trade  takes  place  in  short-term  bonds,  with  all  firms 
owned  by local residents.  The  two forms of portfolio  trade are equiva- 
lent  here,  as  is  clear  from  the  fact  that  the  profit  rate  equals  the 
instantaneous  interest  rate (see  [11]). 
There  are  two  offsetting  influences  at  work  in  determining  the 
current  account.  On  the  one  hand,  the  human  capital-rich  country 
undertakes  relatively  more  investment  in product  development  than 
would be predicted  on the basis of its relative size alone. This excess of 
investment  demand  tends  to create  a current  account  deficit for this 
country.  On  the  other  hand,  the  reward  to human  capital  is falling 
over  time,  while  the  wage  rate of  unskilled  workers is rising,  so that 
the  human  capital-rich  country  experiences  a decline  in its relative 
factor  income.  This  effect  alone  should  lead  country  A  to  save  a 
relatively  greater  share  of  its  income,  at  least  early  on.  For  these 
reasons, it seems possible that the human capital-rich  country may be 
running  either  a deficit or a surplus  on its current  account.  We have 
not been  able to establish  any analytical results that prove otherwise. 
IV.  Multinational  Corporations 
Our  analysis  to  this  point  has maintained  an assumption  that every 
brand  must  be  produced  in  the  country  in  which  it was  originally 
developed.  This  requirement  excludes  the  possibilities  of  interna- 
tional  licensing  and  multinational  investment.  Naturally,  under  the 
conditions  of the previous  section, entrepreneurs  have no incentive  to 
license and firms have no incentive  to become  multinational.  Suppose, 
however,  that R & D requires  more human  capital per unskilled  labor 
than  production  of  industrial  goods  and  that  country  A's  human 
capital  to  unskilled  labor  ratio  is larger  than  factor  proportions  ob- 
served  in the  industrial  sector.  In terms of  figure  2, this means  that 1278  TOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
point E lies above  the ray AC'.  Then  the integrated  equilibrium  can- 
not be replicated  by commodity  trade without  either  licensing  or the 
emergence  of multinational  corporations.  In what follows we explore 
the latter possibility. 
Following  Helpman  (1984),  we  assume  that  production  of  a vari- 
ety comprises  two distinct  activities  that can be decomposed,  so that 
headquarter  services  can  be  located  in  one  country  while  actual 
manufacturing  takes place  in another.  For simplicity we assume  that 
headquarter  services  are  produced  with  human  capital  and  that 
production  plants use these  services and unskilled  labor only.'5  Sup- 
pose also that headquarter  services must be provided  in the country in 
which a brand was developed.  Then  the integrated  equilibrium can be 
reproduced  even when the endowment  point E is above AC'  in figure 
2. The  resulting  allocation  patterns are shown  in figure 4 for the case 
in  which  the  extent  of  multinationality  is  minimal  (see  Helpman 
[1984]  for a discussion  of  this assumption). 
It is clear from the figure that up to time T,,  at which CT- represents 
resource  allocation  in the integrated  equilibrium,  there is no pressure 
for  the  formation  of  multinational  corporations.  However,  immedi- 
ately  after  this  point  in  time,  equality  of  factor  rewards  cannot  be 
maintained  if both activities of industrial firms are concentrated  in the 
same country.  This  exerts  pressure  for their separation,  with the ten- 
dency  to locate manufacturing  operations  in the potentially  unskilled 
labor-cheap  country  (i.e., country  B). At time T the allocation of the 
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15  It is easy to see  how  the  analysis is modified  when  both  activities require  human 
capital and  unskilled  labor, as in Hlelpman and  Krugman  (1985,  chap.  12). PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  1279 
integrated  equilibrium  is described  by point  C'  in the figure.  Its ag- 
gregate  variables  are  reproduced  by the  following  allocation  in  the 
trade equilibrium.  Country  A does  not produce  the traditional  good. 
It devotes  resources  APT  to R & D, PTD  to production  of  industrial 
products  by firms that are not  multinational,  and DE to the  produc- 
tion of headquarter  services by its multinationals.  Country  B devotes 
resources B  CT  to the production  of y-goods,  CT NT  to the production 
of  industrial  products  by  domestic  firms  (which  are  not  multina- 
tional), NTMT  to R & D, and MTE  to production  of modern  goods  in 
plants owned  by country  A's multinational  corporations. 
It is clear from this description  that, starting with t =  Tm, the extent 
of  multinationality-as  measured  by employment  in subsidiaries  or 
their output  volume-is  increasing  at least initially; we have not been 
able to prove that it is increasing  throughout.  We can show, however, 
that the extent  of  multinationality  also increases  during  the final ap- 
proach  to  the  steady  state.  The  latter  point  is seen  as follows.  The 
condition  of minimal  foreign  involvement  implies  that from  time Tm, 
country  A  does  not  produce  the  traditional  good.  Therefore,  after 
that point in time, its factor market-clearing  conditions  read as (com- 
pare with the discussion  of  fig. 4) 
aLnafa  +  aLx(na  -  m)x =  La,  (24) 
aHfnla  +  aHxnax  =  Ha,  (25) 
where  m is the number  of  products  produced  in foreign  subsidiaries 
and x is output  per firm, taken from the integrated  world equilibrium. 
From (25) we observe  that output  of modern  products  is increasing 
in country A if and only if R & D is declining.  Since R & D approaches 
zero when the steady state is approached,  naX  must be increasing  close 
to the steady state.  However,  from  (24) and  (25) we obtain 
mx=  La  (h  -  hn)  +  1  (hn -h,)naX, 
aLxhan  h  hn 
which  together  with  the  previous  result  implies  that  the  degree  of 
multinationality  increases close to the steady state (recall that hn  > hx  is 
assumed  in this section). 
We have  shown  that the  degree  of  multinationality-as  measured 
by the volume  of output  or employment  in subsidiaries-is  increasing 
when  the  multinationals  start  to  form  and  when  the  economy  ap- 
proaches a steady state. These  results can be extended  to cover a third 
definition  of  the  extent  of  multinationality:  the  number  of  varieties 
produced  by  subsidiaries.  This  number  obviously  is rising  initially, 
when the multinationals  start to form. That it is also rising close to the 
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state.  Since  we  have  already  shown  that  mx is rising,  a declining  x 
implies a rising m, that is, an increasing  number  of varieties produced 
by subsidiaries. 
The  proof  proceeds  as follows.  Since the dashed  path in figure  1 is 
above  the E  =  0 line,  the  ratio E/n  is declining  when  the  trajectory 
approaches  point  (Ft,  E). On the other  hand,  from  part d of  proposi- 
tion  1 we know that p is increasing  as this point is approached  because 
in this section  we require  R & D to be more  human  capital intensive 
than x. Therefore,  x  =  sxElpn is declining  close  to the  steady  state. 
Hence,  we have the  following  proposition. 
PROPOSITION  5.  If  differences  in  factor  composition  are  wide 
enough  and product  development  is human  capital intensive  relative 
to production  of  differentiated  products,  then  there  exists  a time  at 
which  multinational  corporations  emerge.  The  degree  of  multina- 
tionality-as  measured  by the number  of products  produced  by sub- 
sidiaries,  their  volume  of  output,  or  employment-is  rising  initially 
and when  the  world  economy  approaches  the steady state. 
In closing this section  we note that the pattern of trade described  in 
the previous  section  need  not hold  in the presence  of multinationals. 
It is clear that the direction  of trade in traditional  goods  must be the 
same as before.  However,  the pattern of trade in modern  goods might 
change  over  time.  Country  A, which  begins  as a net exporter  of dif- 
ferentiated  products  prior  to  the  emergence  of  multinationals,  may 
evolve  into  a net  importer  of  these  goods  if  it ultimately  exports  a 
sufficient  quantity  of  headquarter  services. 
V.  Concluding  Remarks 
We  have  extended  a  number  of  important  results  in  international 
trade theory  to a dynamic  environment  in which comparative  advan- 
tage  must  be  developed  over  time  via the  allocation  of  resources  to 
research  and  development.  In  our  specification,  R & D  must  take 
place  prior  to the  production  of  any new  variety of  a differentiated 
product.  This  R & D is motivated  by the stream of profits that accrues 
to the  producer  of  a differentiated  good  and  is financed  by savings 
that are endogenously  determined.  When  R & D, production  of dif- 
ferentiated  products,  and  production  of a homogeneous  good  all re- 
quire fixed  input  proportions  of two primary factors, then  the Heck- 
scher-Ohlin  pattern  of trade is preserved  all along  the dynamic  path 
of  the  trading  equilibrium.  This  is true  despite  the  fact that trade is 
not balanced  along  this path.  We also established  that if product  de- 
velopment  is human  capital intensive  relative to production  of differ- 
entiated  products,  the volume  of trade as a fraction of world GNP or 
world expenditure  grows over time. Finally, for certain factor endow- PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  12 81 
ments,  we  have  predicted  the  emergence  of  multinational  corpora- 
tions  and  shown  that  in  these  circumstances  the  extent  of  multina- 
tional activity generally  rises over  time. 
The  framework  that  we  have  developed  here  is  suitable  for  the 
study of additional  issues. Our analysis has excluded  factor accumula- 
tion and has restricted attention  to horizontal  product differentiation. 
We  plan  in  future  work  to consider  the  interaction  between  capital 
investment  and technological  progress  in determining  trade dynamics 
and  to  study  the  evolution  of  trade  patterns  with  vertically  differ- 
entiated  goods  and hence  endogenous  product obsolescence.  Perhaps 
more  fundamentally,  after slight adaptation  of our framework,  it be- 
comes  possible  to study the links between  the trade environment  (in- 
cluding  policy) and  long-run  rates of  growth.  We present  our  initial 
efforts  to understand  the relationship  between  aspects of the interna- 
tional  economy  and  long-run  economic  performance  when  product 
innovation  drives  growth  in Grossman  and  Helpman  (1988). 
Appendix 
We provide in this Appendix a proof of proposition 1 by explicitly  calculating 
expressions for the comovement of six variables  with expenditure E. By sub- 
stituting (16) and (17) into (14) and using the result together with (7), (10), 
and (12) for the special case considered in Section IID-namely,  two factors 
of production and constant coefficients-we  obtain the following system: 
I=  aLw  +  allr,  (Al) 
op  =  a1xw + avexr,  (A2) 
PY=  anw + aHyr,  (A3) 
L  aLh  +  alxsx E  +  aly(1  -sx)  E-,  (A4) 
H =  aHln  +  anxsx  -  + anly(1  sx) -  (A5) 
where w is the reward  to unskilled labor  and r is the reward  to human capital. 
This system  enables us to solve (w, r,  p, py,  it) as functions  of E. In what  follows, 
we calculate  the proportional  rate of change of each one of these variables  in 
response to a proportional change in expenditure of E-dEIE  =  1; a cir- 
cumflex  over a variable  indicates  a proportional  rate of change. The following 
expressions use the standard  notation; that is, 0,, is the share of input i in the 
cost of activity  j and XA,  is the share of factor i employed in activity  j: 
Wt =  I  OHn  (XHn  -  XLn),  (A6) 
r  =  l  OLn(Xl n  -  Xn),  (A7) 
p  =  A  (0,,I~x  -  OL,)(XHfl  -  Xn ),  (A8) 1282  JOURNAL  OF  POLITICAL  ECONOMY 
=  I  (OLy 
- 
OL)(H  XLn),  (A9) 
n =  (OLy  -  OLx)(XLxXHy  -  LyXHx),  (AI0) 
where 
=  (OLx  -  -  X)(\Lx\H.  \Ln.XHx)  (AI  ) 
+  (O  Ly  -  OLn))(XLyHn  -  LnHy  ) (Al)- 
From the definition  of A, we have A >  0 because  (OLi  -  OLj) is of the same sign 
as (XLZiHj  -  XLjXHi),  being  positive  when  i is labor intensive  relative  toj  and 
negative  when i is human  capital intensive  relative toj.  We have assumed  that 
aHylaLy <  HIL  <  aHl/aL,,  i  =  x, n, which  implies 
XHy  -  XLy <  0,  (AI2a) 
HI  -  Li  >  0  for i  =  x,  n.  (AI2b) 
Condition  (Al 2b) proves  parts b and c of proposition  1, given part h, which 
is proved  in the  text.  From  (A6) and  (A9),  we obtain 
W  -  pa  =  Ad OHy('Hn  -  XLn);  (A 13) 
from  (A8) and  (A9),  we obtain 
PY  -  P =  +  (OLy -  OLx)(XHn  -  XLn);  (A  14) 
and  from  (A7) and  (A8),  we obtain 
p-  r= 
1  -  XLn).  (A 15) 
Equations (A 13)-(A  15) together  with (A 12b), part h, and the assumption  that 
y is labor intensive relative  to x  which implies  O  Ly >  OLx-prove part a of the 
proposition. Part  d is a direct consequence of part h, (A8), and (AI2b). Part  e 
is a direct consequence of (A  10) and part h. Moreover,  (A  10) proves that the 
function v(E) is declining because the right-hand side of (AIO)  is negative. 
From (16) and (17) we have X =  E -  p and Y =  E -  py. Using these 
expressions, E  =  1, as well as (A8), (A9), and (Al 1), we obtain 
X=Ad  0Ly  - 
)OLx)(XLy\H. 
-  XLnXHy)  (A16) 
and 
A  =  Ly  OLx)(XLnXHx  -  LxXHn)  (A 17) 
Equations (Al 2a) and (A12b) together with the assumption that y is labor 
intensive relative to x imply that the right-hand side of (A  16) is positive.  This 
together with part h proves part  of the proposition.  From (A17), it is evident 
that, given that  y is labor intensive relative to x, the right-hand side is positive 
if and only if n is labor intensive relative to x, which together with part h 
proves part g. PRODUCT  DEVELOPMENT  1283 
References 
Dixit, Avinash,  and  Norman,  Victor  D.  Theory of International  Trade:  A Dual, 
General  Equilibrium  Approach.  Cambridge:  Cambridge  Univ.  Press,  1980. 
Dollar, David. "Technological  Innovation,  Capital Mobility, and the  Product 
Cycle in the North-South  Trade."  A.E.R.  76 (March  1986):  177-90. 
Feenstra,  Robert  C., and Judd,  Kenneth  L. "Tariffs,  Technology  Transfer, 
and Welfare."J.P.E.  90  (December  1982):  1142-65. 
Grossman,  Gene  M., and  Helpman,  Elhanan.  "Comparative  Advantage  and 
Long-Run  Growth."  Discussion  Paper  in  Economics  no.  142.  Princeton, 
N.J.: Princeton  Univ.,  Woodrow  Wilson School,  1988. 
Helpman,  Elhanan.  "A Simple  Theory  of  International  Trade  with Multina- 
tional Corporations."J.P.E.  92  (June  1984): 451-71. 
Helpman,  Elhanan, and Krugman,  Paul R. Market Structure and Foreign  Trade: 
Increasing  Returns,  Imperfect  Competition,  and  the International  Economy.  Cam- 
bridge,  Mass.: MIT  Press,  1985. 
Jensen,  Richard,  and  Thursby,  Marie.  "A  Decision  Theoretical  Model  of 
Innovation,  Technology  Transfer,  and Trade." Rev.  Econ.  Studies 54 (Octo- 
ber  1987): 631-47. 
Judd,  Kenneth  L. "On the  Performance  of  Patents." Econometrica  53  (May 
1985): 567-85. 
Krugman,  Paul R. "Increasing  Returns,  Monopolistic  Competition,  and  In- 
ternational  Trade."J.  Internal.  Econ.  9 (November  1979): 469-79.  (a) 
. "A Model of Innovation,  Technology  Transfer,  and the World Distri- 
bution  of  Income."J.P.E.  87 (April  1979):  253-66.  (b) 
. "Intraindustry  Specialization  and  the  Gains  from  Trade." J.P.E.  89 
(October  1981): 959-73. 
Segerstrom,  Paul S.; Anant, T. C. A.; and Dinopoulos,  Elias. "A Schumpeter- 
ian Model of the Product Life Cycle." Econometrics  and Economic Theory 
Paper no.  8606.  East Lansing:  Michigan  State Univ.,  1987. 